Sobre la Intencionalidad Afectiva de Scheler1435
Barra lateral del artículo
Contenido principal del artículo
Resumen
The following essay was first given as a virtual lecture on April 12, 2018 to La Salle University. The scope of the lecture was expository and had two aims. First, I explained how Scheler’s affective intentionality undergirds moral theorizing. Second, I explained Scheler’s value rankings disclosed in affective intentionality. Overall, I hoped to convey to the audience how unique Scheler’s position in the history of ethics is.
Descargas
Detalles del artículo
El autor puede disponer de su artículo para su archivo en repositorios institucionales o en páginas web personales, con la referencia y agradecimientos a la fuente donde se ha publicado.
Citas
Frings, M. (2001). The Mind of Max Scheler: The First Comprehensive Guide Based on the Complete Works. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Hackett, J. (2018). Persons and Values in Pragmatic Phenomenology. Delaware: Vernon Press.
Scheler, M. (1973). Formalism in Ethics. (R. Funk, & M. Frings, Trans.) Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
Scheler, M. (2010). Ressentiment. (L. B. Coser, & W. Holdheim, Trans.) Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Spader, P. (2002). Scheler Ethical Personalism: Its Logic, Development, and Promise. New York: Fordham University Press.