The reasonable disagreement in a peer horizon
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26457/lrf.v140i140.3628Keywords:
Desacuerdo, pares epistémicos, acionalidad, horizonte de paridadAbstract
The objectives of this paper are two: a) to integrate the notion of epistemic peers
in terms of the “peer horizon” into the debate on the rationality of positions in
disagreement; b) to argue that both the firm point of view and the conciliatory
point of view or the skeptic one are effective in the handling of our attributions
of knowledge. The alternation of these positions is a rational attitude, and such
positions depend on whether the disagreement is within the first, the second or
the third person. The conclusion is that the rationality of the choices about the
positions in disagreement rests on the strength of our character at the time of
undertaking certain discussions, either with other peers or with ourselves
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