Sobre la Intencionalidad Afectiva de Scheler

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J. Edward Hackett

Resumen

The following essay was first given as a virtual lecture on April 12, 2018 to La Salle University. The scope of the lecture was expository and had two aims. First, I explained how Scheler’s affective intentionality undergirds moral theorizing. Second, I explained Scheler’s value rankings disclosed in affective intentionality.  Overall, I hoped to convey to the audience how unique Scheler’s position in the history of ethics is. 

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Sobre la Intencionalidad Afectiva de Scheler. (2018). Revista del Centro de Investigación de la Universidad la Salle, 13(49), 11-24. https://doi.org/10.26457/recein.v13i49.1761

Referencias

Frings, M. (2001). The Mind of Max Scheler: The First Comprehensive Guide Based on the Complete Works. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

Hackett, J. (2018). Persons and Values in Pragmatic Phenomenology. Delaware: Vernon Press.

Scheler, M. (1973). Formalism in Ethics. (R. Funk, & M. Frings, Trans.) Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.

Scheler, M. (2010). Ressentiment. (L. B. Coser, & W. Holdheim, Trans.) Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

Spader, P. (2002). Scheler Ethical Personalism: Its Logic, Development, and Promise. New York: Fordham University Press.