The ipsiety: a reformulation attempt

Abstract

In my two works dedicated to the problem of the event, I have always formulated my thinking in terms of the ipseity as a thought and not as a thinking to the self (moi). Today, there are many authors who use these two concepts as quasisynonyms. However, I think that both concepts respond to a different type of questions and that they should be distinguished. This is the point I would like to make clear in the following reflections, referring to the first author who has made a peculiar use of a concept which in French is usually translated by "ipseity", namely, the Heideggerian concept of Selbstheit. Therefore, the following exposition will be both an attempt to explain the concept of ipseity from Heidegger and a defense in favor of this concept as an alternative to that - much more problematic in my eyes - of I (moi), an alternative to the way of the egologies that have triumphed in philosophy from Descartes to Husserl.